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The 1,400 administrative law judges (ALJs) who work for the Social Security Administration are making a sig-nificant contribution to the economic problems the United States is now experiencing. When an applicant 
for Social Security disability benefits receives two negative deci-
sions from the SSA, he can appeal to an ALJ. Over the past four 
decades, the proportion of the U.S. population that has been 
determined to be permanently disabled has more than doubled, 
according to the SSA. The cost of the disability program has 
increased over four-fold over the past two decades. During that 
period, the cost of disability benefit awards increased from 10 
percent of the SSA’s total budget to 18 percent. Annual pay-
ments from the trust fund that was established to pay disability 
benefits are now $124 billion dollars — one percent of total U.S. 
gross domestic product. As a result, that fund is expected to be 
exhausted by 2018, many years before the expected exhaustion 
of the Social Security Old-Age or Medicare trust funds. 
The large increase in the proportion of the U.S. population 
that has been determined to be permanently disabled is also hav-
ing broader adverse effects on the performance of the U.S. econ-
omy. The proportion of U.S. adult males who are available for 
work has declined from 80 percent in 1970 to 71 percent in 2010. 
As The Economist noted in an article last April 28th, “Widespread 
male worklessness has huge economic, fiscal, and social costs.” 
Most of the increase in the proportion of the population that 
has been determined to be permanently disabled is attributable 
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to ALJ decisions that reversed initial SSA decisions that denied 
applications for benefits on the basis of determinations that the 
applicants were not disabled. Thus, for instance, a single SSA 
ALJ, Charles Bridges of Harrisburg, Pa., overruled the SSA and 
awarded benefits to 2,285 applicants in 2007 alone, at a cost 
of $2.1 billion over four years. Unless we address this problem 
promptly and effectively, it will increase in severity and scope. 
As the tendency of ALJs to grant benefits that the SSA twice 
denied has become well-known, there has been a predictable 
increase in the number of applications for benefits. In 2008 alone, 
the number of applications increased by 21 percent, to 2.8 million, 
and the backlog of cases pending before ALJs reached 752,000. 
The number of decisions granting benefits increased 28 percent 
between 2007 and 2010. Since the average cost of a decision grant-
ing disability benefits is $245,000 and ALJs grant benefits in 60 
percent of cases, the total cost of the pending cases alone will be 
about $117 billion. 
As a practical matter, ALJ decisions that grant disability 
benefits are final and irrevocable commitments of taxpayer 
funds. The SSA lacks the resources to review ALJ decisions that 
grant benefits, and less than one percent of individuals who are 
awarded benefits ever leave the rolls of beneficiaries.
Questionable Decisions
If there was reason to believe that all, or even most, ALJ deci-
sions granting disability benefits were accurate reflections of 
the health status of the individual applicants, I would reluc-
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1956016
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tantly accept the high cost of those decisions as one of the 
costs of living in a humane and compassionate country. There 
is no reason to indulge that belief, however, and there are many 
reasons to reject it as highly unlikely.
Nonexertional disabilities | First, most of the applicants who 
are awarded benefits by ALJs are determined by the ALJ to 
have a “nonexertional restriction” — either a mental condition 
such as anxiety or depression, or pain attributable to a mus-
culoskeletal condition. Thus, for instance, between 1983 and 
2003, awards based on nonexertional restrictions increased 
323 percent; by 2003, they accounted for over half of all awards. 
Nonexertional restrictions have characteristics that are impor-
tant in evaluating disability decisions. There are no objective 
diagnostic criteria that can be used to verify or refute a claim 
that an individual has a nonexertional restriction. Moreover, all 
such restrictions are matters of degree. The Social Security Act 
renders an individual eligible for disability benefits only if he 
has an impairment “of such severity that he … cannot … engage 
in any … kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the 
national economy.” Yet, there are no objective diagnostic criteria 
that can be used to measure the degree of an applicant’s anxiety, 
depression, or pain. 
Finally, nonexertional restrictions are ubiquitous. The 
National Institute of Medicine has found that 116 million 
Americans suffer from chronic pain, while the National Institute 
of Mental Health has found that 61 million Americans suffer 
from mental disease. It is a rare person who reaches my age (68) 
without having experienced anxiety, depression, and/or pain 
over some significant periods of time. Thus, at some point in 
life, almost every person can make a plausible claim of eligibility 
for permanent disability benefits based on nonexertional restric-
tions. That claim can neither be supported nor refuted based on 
application of objective diagnostic criteria.
Subjective decisions | The patterns of ALJ decisions granting 
or denying disability benefits vary greatly among ALJs. Studies 
of ALJ disability decisionmaking have documented massive 
unexplained differences in the rate at which ALJs grant or deny 
benefits. Thus, for instance, a study of ALJ decisions made in 
1976 found that, while 45 percent of ALJs granted benefits in 
40–60 percent of cases, 12 percent granted benefits in less than 
28 percent of cases and 10 percent granted benefits in over 72 
percent of cases. Given the large number of cases randomly 
assigned to each ALJ, variations of that magnitude can only 
be explained as a reflection of the widely differing attitudes of 
E N T I T L E M E N T S
36 | REGULATION | Fall 2011
ALJs. As a team of six scholars concluded in 1978; “the outcome 
of cases depends more on who decides the case than on what 
the facts are.”
The variation in the decisionmaking patterns of ALJs has 
increased significantly since the 1970s. In the first half of 2011, 
for instance, the average rate at which ALJs awarded benefits was 
60 percent, but 100 ALJs awarded benefits in over 90 percent of 
cases while 27 ALJs awarded benefits in over 95 percent of cases. 
That dramatic difference in grant rates is inherently inconsistent 
with an accurate decisionmaking process.
Increasing disability rates | The temporal pattern of ALJ dis-
ability decisions is inconsistent with a belief in the accuracy 
of those decisions. Both the average ALJ grant rate and the 
distribution of ALJ grant rates have increased dramatically 
over the past three decades. The net effect has been a doubling 
of the proportion of the population that has been determined 
to be permanently disabled. If ALJ disability decisions are an 
accurate reflection of the health of the U.S. population, we 
are experiencing a public health crisis. If we are to believe ALJ 
decisions, the incidence of permanent disability in the U.S. 
population has more than doubled since 1970. That belief is 
beyond implausible. 
Overruling the SSA | A case in which an ALJ grants disability 
benefits is a case in which the SSA bureaucracy has twice deter-
mined that the applicant is not disabled. The initial bureau-
cratic decision is made by a team that consists of a disability 
examiner and a medical adviser. The team analyzes the paper 
record, including the submissions of the applicant and the 
applicant’s treating physicians. The decisionmaking team can 
solicit such additional medical information as it determines to 
be needed to complete the record and can order such further 
examinations by consultative physicians as it determines to 
be needed to make an accurate determination of disability. If 
the initial team of decisionmakers denies the application, the 
applicant can request and obtain a second determination by a 
new examiner/medical adviser team. The new team can, and 
often does, order additional consultative examinations. The 
SSA implements a quality assurance program in which it evalu-
ates the decisions of the examiner/medical adviser teams to 
ensure the accuracy of their decisions and to provide feedback 
and training to disability examiners and medical advisers to the 
extent that the quality assurance office identifies flaws or gaps 
in the decisionmaking process.
If both the first examiner/medical adviser team and the 
second examiner/medical adviser team find that the applicant 
is not disabled, the applicant can obtain a de novo oral hearing 
before an ALJ. The applicant can be, and usually is, represented 
by counsel at the hearing. The government is never represented 
at a hearing before an ALJ. The only government employee at 
the hearing is the ALJ, who has a duty to assist the applicant in 
the development of evidence in support of his claim. If the ALJ 
finds that the applicant is disabled, that decision is final as a 
practical matter. In theory, the SSA can review an ALJ decision 
that grants an application for benefits, but its past efforts to do 
so have been thwarted by a combination of judicial resistance 
and inadequate funding.
The decision to allow an applicant to appeal two negative 
decisions made by two examiner/medical adviser teams to an ALJ 
and to allow an ALJ’s decision to grant an application for benefits 
that has been rejected twice by the bureaucracy to become final 
must be based on the belief that ALJ decisions are more likely to 
be accurate than decisions made by two independent examiner/
medical adviser teams. There is no basis for that belief, however, 
and many reasons for the contrary belief. The ALJ has no medi-
cal education and, unlike a disability examiner, the ALJ has no 
medical adviser. Moreover, unlike the examiner/medical adviser 
teams, the ALJ’s decisionmaking process is not subject to any 
form of evaluation or other means of assuring the quality of the 
decisionmaking process. The SSA is prohibited from supervis-
ing ALJs or evaluating their performance, and the agency’s past 
efforts to implement quality assurance programs applicable to 
ALJs have been abandoned as a result of hostility from district 
courts and lack of adequate resources.
The belief that ALJ decisions are more likely to be accurate 
than bureaucratic decisions must be based on the belief that oral 
hearings yield more accurate findings of fact than decisions based 
on paper hearings. That belief, in turn, must be based primarily 
on the belief that the ability to observe the demeanor of a witness 
helps a decisionmaker determine whether the witness is provid-
ing honest and accurate testimony. That belief is longstanding, 
but it is supported by no evidence and it is contradicted by a large 
body of evidence in the psychology literature.
Inability to control ALJs | The executive branch of government 
is powerless to address the growing problem of ALJs’ unwar-
ranted commitment of billions of dollars to undeserving appli-
cants for disability benefits. A front-page article in last May 
19th’s Wall Street Journal focused attention on one ALJ, David B. 
Daugherty of Huntington, W.Va., who had awarded benefits in 
100 percent of the 729 cases he decided in the first six months 
of fiscal 2011 and in 1,280 of the 1,284 cases he decided in 2010. 
It quoted the commissioner of Social Security: “We mostly have 
a very productive judiciary that makes high-quality decisions, 
and we’ve got some outliers and we’ve done what we can. Our 
hands are tied on some of the more extreme cases.” A week later, 
the commissioner apparently changed his views and attempted 
to address the problem that the Journal highlighted. The SSA 
suspended Daugherty indefinitely.
There are two problems with the SSA response to the problem. 
First, it is patently inadequate. The problem is not limited to one 
or even a few outliers. Many ALJs grant benefits at indefensibly 
high rates. Second, the action against Daugherty is not within 
the SSA’s power. An agency can take an action of any type against 
an ALJ, specifically including suspension, only if it persuades 
another ALJ at the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) that 
it has “good cause” to take the action. That is extremely difficult 
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in general and impossible in a context in which the ALJ’s pattern 
of decisions is the putative basis for the removal attempt.
A case that the Federal Circuit decided in 2011 illustrates the 
difficulty of the task of removing an ALJ even in extreme circum-
stances. An SSA ALJ, Danvers E. Long of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 
beat his domestic partner and his young child. The two victims 
fled to the house of friends, who called the police. The police took 
pictures of the damage to the faces of the victims and charged 
the ALJ with battery. The SSA filed a petition with the MSPB in 
which it sought to remove the ALJ for good cause. The MSPB 
assigned the case to another ALJ. The presiding ALJ found that 
the defendant ALJ had not beaten the child and had not struck 
his domestic partner with his fist. The presiding ALJ stated that 
he believed the testimony of the defendant ALJ and disbelieved 
the testimony of the several witnesses who testified for the SSA. 
On review of the ALJ’s initial decision, the MSPB issued an opin-
ion in which it found that the defendant ALJ had hit the child and 
hit his domestic partner with his fist. The MSPB then held that 
the ALJ could be removed for good cause.
The presiding ALJ based his findings of fact on his observa-
tion of the demeanor of the witnesses. That was an obvious 
attempt to insulate his findings and decision from potential 
reversal by the MSPB. The Administrative Procedure Act gives 
an agency the power to reject an initial decision of an ALJ on 
appeal. Specifically, the APA provides, “On appeal from or 
review of the initial decision, the agency has all of the pow-
ers which it would have in making the initial decision.” The 
Supreme Court has interpreted that provision to allow an 
agency to replace the findings of fact made by an ALJ with the 
agency’s own findings of facts inconsistent with those of the 
ALJ as long as the agency’s findings are supported by substantial 
evidence. Like most circuit courts, however, the Federal Circuit 
has qualified the APA and the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the APA in the context of findings based on demeanor. Under 
Federal Circuit precedent, when an ALJ makes findings based 
on demeanor, an agency can substitute its findings for those 
of the ALJ only by satisfying an unusually demanding duty to 
explain its action.
Courts have long attached great significance to the ability of a 
trier of facts to observe a witness’s demeanor. That judicial tradi-
tion is not supported by any evidence, however. Indeed, there is 
a substantial body of research that has consistently concluded 
that observation of a witness’s demeanor is not at all helpful in 
determining whether a witness is providing honest and accurate 
testimony.
The Federal Circuit upheld the MSPB decision that rejected 
the presiding ALJ’s findings of fact and upheld the agency’s 
decision to remove the ALJ for good cause. The court concluded 
that the MSPB had met its burden of explaining adequately why 
it rejected the presiding ALJ’s findings of fact. One judge wrote 
a concurring opinion, however, in which he expressed concern 
about the MSPB’s basis for its findings and suggested that he 
would have decided the case for the defendant ALJ in another case 
that did not involve facts that were so “unusual.” It seems highly 
unlikely that the court would uphold an MSPB decision remov-
ing an ALJ for good cause in the much less “unusual” case of an 
ALJ who has granted benefits in all, or virtually all, of the cases he 
has decided. Indeed, most courts have reacted with hostility to 
more subtle SSA attempts to exercise any degree of control over 
the decisionmaking patterns of ALJs. 
 
Potential Solutions
There are many directions we could take in an effort to address 
this problem. Below are a few that have been suggested.
Require employers to share the cost of disability decisions | 
Some scholars urge adoption of the approach that seems to 
be yielding improvements in the Netherlands. Dutch law now 
requires that an applicant’s employer pay part of the costs of 
providing disability benefits for the initial years a beneficiary 
receives benefits. By requiring employers to bear that cost, the 
Dutch system gives employers incentives to accommodate an 
individual’s disabilities in various ways, to provide an individ-
ual with training that will enable him to perform another job 
that is within his new, more limited capabilities, and to contest 
an individual’s claim of disability. 
This option may be worth consideration in the United States. 
I do not know how much employers can do to discourage poten-
tial applicants from seeking disability benefits through accom-
modation or assistance, but I am confident that giving employ-
ers an incentive to contest an applicant’s claim in a proceeding 
before an ALJ would reduce the number of cases in which ALJs 
grant benefits to undeserving applicants. At present, when an 
applicant appears before an ALJ, he is usually represented by a 
lawyer who can earn as much as $6,000 if he can persuade the 
ALJ to grant his client benefits. The ALJ, in turn, has a duty to 
assist the applicant in gathering and presenting the evidence 
required to determine whether he is disabled. No one represents 
the agency or the taxpayer in disability proceedings before an 
ALJ. If employers were required to bear a significant share of the 
total cost of a grant of disability benefits, they would be likely 
to retain lawyers to contest applications by employees they 
believe to be undeserving and the presence of lawyers opposing 
undeserving applicants would change the outcome of many 
cases. As the proportion of cases in which applicants succeeded 
in proceedings before ALJs declined, the number of applicants 
inevitably would decline as well. 
Of course, these results could be obtained more directly 
by adopting the proposal that the Social Security Advisory 
Board has long made: to assign agency lawyers to represent the 
government in disability hearings. I am sure that both the Bar 
and my students would appreciate the effects of this proposal 
in improving employment opportunities for lawyers. It has a 
potentially fatal cost, however. Converting a high proportion of 
disability cases before ALJs into hard-fought adversarial proceed-
ings undoubtedly would increase the average amount of time 
required to conduct each hearing. That, in turn, would reduce 
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the number of cases each ALJ could decide, thereby increasing 
the waiting time for a hearing. Delay in the availability of ALJ 
hearings has long been one of the major problems in the dis-
ability decisionmaking process. That problem has increased in 
recent years as a result of the enormous increase in applications 
filed and hearings requested. The average waiting period in 2007 
was 512 days. It is difficult to support a proposal that responds to 
one major problem — excessive generosity in the decisionmaking 
process — by exacerbating another major problem — undue delay 
in that process.
Require SSA review of past decisions to grant benefits | The 
United Kingdom is considering another potential solution: 
mandatory periodic review of all past decisions to grant disabil-
ity benefits. Some sort of review process should be part of the 
U.S. solution to the problem. The SSA has previously engaged 
in review of past awards, with impressive results. For every $1 
it spent engaging in review of prior awards, the agency recov-
ered $11 in benefits that other-
wise would have been paid to 
undeserving individuals. Dur-
ing the period 1980–1983, the 
SSA reviewed a large number 
of prior awards. It found that 
40 percent of the beneficiaries 
whose cases it reviewed were 
not disabled. 
The agency’s review programs have elicited strong pushback 
from courts, advocates for the disabled, and politicians, however. 
In recent years, the SSA has largely abandoned its review pro-
grams. It has allocated virtually all of its scarce decisionmaking 
resources to an understandable effort to reduce the delays in 
the process of deciding whether to grant benefits. Thus, the SSA 
must be able to identify some new source of resources to fund a 
review program.
Implement quality controls on ALJs | The SSA could attempt 
to address the problem by reinstituting some version of the 
ALJ quality control programs it implemented in the 1970s 
and early 1980s. During that period, the agency responded 
to the problem of delay in the ALJ decisionmaking process by 
announcing productivity goals for ALJs and it responded to 
the problems of inconsistency and excessive generosity in ALJ 
decisionmaking by announcing a presumptive range of deci-
sions to grant benefits. That program elicited strong pushback 
from courts and ALJs. 
After several district courts held that the program was an 
unlawful interference with the decisional independence of ALJs, 
the Second Circuit issued an ambiguous opinion in which it 
seemed to uphold parts of the program. The court recognized 
that “policies designed to insure a reasonable degree of unifor-
mity among ALJ decisions are not only within the bounds of 
legitimate agency supervision but are to be encouraged.” The 
court expressed “concern,” however, that the presumptively per-
missible range of grants of benefits the agency had announced 
would put pressure on ALJs to deny benefits in some cases. The 
court characterized such an effect as “a clear infringement of 
decisional independence.” The court approved of the SSA’s “rea-
sonable efforts to increase the production levels of ALJs,” with the 
caveat that the agency could only establish reasonable goals and 
not unreasonable quotas.
The Second Circuit’s ambivalent attitude toward the pre-
sumptive range of grant decisions the SSA had announced, 
coupled with several district court opinions that excoriated the 
agency for announcing the presumptive range of grant decisions, 
undoubtedly contributed to the agency’s decision to reconsider 
its program. The agency soon discovered, however, that the entire 
program, including the productivity measures the Second Circuit 
approved, was toothless.
The SSA identified one ALJ who had consistently fallen below 
the minimum level of productivity that the Second Circuit 
seemed to have approved. It provided that ALJ with additional 
training and warned him that it would remove him for good 
cause if he did not improve his productivity. When the ALJ had 
not improved his productivity two and one-half years later, the 
SSA filed a petition with the MSPB to remove the ALJ for good 
cause. The board refused on the basis that the SSA had not estab-
lished good cause to remove the ALJ.
The MSPB’s unwillingness to help the agency implement 
its program to improve ALJ productivity explains the SSA’s 
decision not even to attempt to enlist the board’s assistance 
in implementing its more controversial effort to establish a 
presumptively acceptable range of favorable and unfavorable 
decisions and the SSA’s ultimate decision to abandon that 
effort. Given the reaction of both the judiciary and the board 
to the SSA’s past efforts to exercise some degree of control over 
its ALJs, the agency would have a reasonable prospect of success 
in a new effort of this type only if it took a new approach. The 
SSA and MSPB could conduct a joint rulemaking to issue a rule 
that would simultaneously identify a presumptively permissible 
range of decisions to grant disability benefits and adopt an 
interpretation of “good cause” that authorizes the agency and 
the board to remove or otherwise discipline an ALJ for deviating 
from the presumptively permissible range of decisions without 
an adequate explanation.
The rule would have to be issued jointly because the SSA has 
exclusive power to issue rules applicable to the disability program 
while the MSPB has exclusive power to issue rules that define 
“good cause” for purposes of the statutory provision that autho-
For every $1 it spent engaging in review of prior awards, 
the SSA recovered $11 in benefits that otherwise  
would have been paid to undeserving individuals.
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rizes the board to remove an ALJ for good cause. If the SSA and 
the MSPB provided good reasons supported by solid evidence, 
they would have a good chance of persuading a court to uphold 
such a rule.
Eliminate nonexertional restrictions as a potential disability | 
There is broad agreement that the problem of excessive ALJ 
grants of disability benefits began as a result of the 1967 and 
1984 amendments to the Social Security Act that had the 
effect of broadening the category of impairments that can 
potentially be the basis for a determination that an applicant 
is permanently disabled. Most of the dubious grants of ben-
efits by ALJs are attributable to findings that an applicant 
suffers from nonexertional restrictions, such as mental ill-
ness or pain, that are so severe that he cannot perform the 
functions of any job available in the U.S. economy. It follows 
that we could eliminate the problem simply by amending the 
statute to eliminate nonexertional restrictions as a potential 
qualifying impairment.
Such a statutory change would have a major disadvantage, 
however. It would sweep too broadly. There undoubtedly are 
individuals with mental illnesses and/or pain so severe that it is 
truly disabling. We should not exclude all such individuals from 
potential eligibility if we can identify another viable means of 
addressing the problem of excessive awards to individuals who 
suffer from less severe mental illness and/or pain.
Eliminate the right to appeal to an ALJ | Finally, we could 
eliminate completely the right to appeal a denial of disability 
benefits to an ALJ. The right to appeal to an ALJ is predicated 
on the belief that an ALJ decision based on an oral hearing is 
more likely to yield accurate findings than two bureaucratic 
decisions based on paper hearings, i.e., consideration of writ-
ten submissions from the applicant and his supporters and 
from a variety of medical professionals. There is no evidence 
to support that belief. There are instead many reasons to 
believe that two independent decisions based on paper hear-
ings are more likely to yield accurate findings than an ALJ 
decision based on an oral hearing.
The belief that ALJ decisions are more accurate than bureau-
cratic decisions necessarily is based on some combination of 
two subsidiary beliefs: that oral hearings are likely to result 
in more accurate findings than paper hearings, and that ALJs 
are more likely to be unbiased decisionmakers because of their 
independence from the bureaucracy. Neither of those beliefs 
is justified.
Making ALJs independent of the agencies that employ them 
eliminates one potential source of bias, but it simultaneously 
increases ALJs’ vulnerability to other sources of bias. SSA ALJs 
are located in regional offices; thus, they decide whether their 
neighbors are entitled to disability benefits at taxpayer expense. 
An ALJ can become very popular in the community in which he 
doles out billions of dollars to applicants for benefits. The desire 
to be popular in your community can be a powerful source of 
bias in the SSA disability decisionmaking process. The natural 
desire to be popular undoubtedly helps to explain the pattern of 
decisions of the aforementioned Judge Daugherty who granted 
benefits in 2,009 of 2,013 cases in 2010 and the first half of 2011, 
at a cost to taxpayers of over $492 million. By all accounts, Judge 
Daugherty relishes his status as one of the most popular people 
in his city and county. It is fair to infer that the over 100 ALJs 
who grant benefits in over 90 percent of cases are affected by the 
same source of bias.
Of course, an ALJ who is independent of — and, hence, beyond 
the control of — the agency that employs him is unusually vul-
nerable to other potential sources of bias. Thus, for instance, it 
is impossible to describe the pattern of decisions of Judge Bruce 
Levine, one of two ALJs at the Commodities Future Trading 
Commission, as unbiased. Levine has never decided a case in 
favor of an investor, thus demonstrating beyond any doubt his 
bias against investors.
The other basis for the belief that oral hearings yield more 
accurate findings is the widespread assumption that the oppor-
tunity of the trier of fact to observe the demeanor of witnesses is 
an aid to accurate fact-finding. Like the assumption that indepen-
dence from the government eliminates bias, this assumption is 
contradicted by a large body of evidence. Numerous studies have 
found that the ability to observe the demeanor of a witness is a 
distraction from the process of finding facts that detracts from 
the accuracy of the process, rather than an aid to fact-finding that 
improves accuracy.
I accept the findings of social scientists that applicants for 
benefits value the opportunity for an oral hearing before an 
ALJ even if the ALJ decides not to grant the requested benefits. 
I do not believe, however, that we can afford the massive costs 
of oral hearings before ALJs merely to assist applicants for ben-
efits in their efforts to accept a negative decision. The direct 
costs of the ALJ decisionmaking process, in the form of the 
salary and benefits paid to ALJs, is well over $2 billion per year. 
The direct costs of ALJs are dwarfed by their indirect costs, in 
the form of scores of billions of dollars paid to undeserving 
applicants for benefits.
We could save scores of billions by removing all of the ALJs 
who now decide appeals from SSA decisions that deny disability 
benefits. In 1953 the Supreme Court held that removal of a class 
of ALJs on the basis of a determination that they are no longer 
needed or are no longer affordable satisfies the statutory good 
cause prerequisite for removal. We could then use the over $2 
billion in personnel cost savings to fund and staff the sorely 
needed program to review prior awards of benefits to terminate 
benefits that are now being paid to many thousands of benefi-
ciaries who do not actually satisfy the standard of disability in 
the Social Security Act. 
Elimination of the 1,400 SSA ALJs would also produce 
another major benefit to the SSA. As then-professor Antonin 
Scalia documented in 1979, ALJs impose large costs of two types 
on agencies. First, they typically have the highest salaries in the 
agency. Second, they occupy a high proportion (24–73 percent) 
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of the Senior Executive Service (SES) positions available at an 
agency. The removal of ALJs from the SSA would allow the agency 
to hire a large number of talented people to manage its impor-
tant programs by freeing up a large number of SES positions for 
that purpose. As Scalia put it, the decision to allocate a massive 
proportion of an agency’s personnel budget and SES positions 
to ALJs “represents the triumph of the courtroom mystique over 
reason.”
A corollary change should accompany the elimination of 
ALJs from the disability decisionmaking process. District judges 
should be instructed to review SSA decisions as final decisions 
based solely on the record created at the agency. At present, dis-
trict judges are required to permit applicants who appeal a deci-
sion denying benefits to obtain a remand to the SSA to allow the 
applicant to introduce new evidence. That is not the way other 
agency review proceedings are conducted. The norm in other con-
texts is judicial review based solely on the record before the agency.
Due process? | I anticipate that some people will argue that 
implementation of my proposal would violate due process. In 
Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court upheld the SSA’s sole 
reliance on paper hearings to terminate disability benefits 
based on an agency finding that a beneficiary is not disabled. 
The Court made that decision, however, in the context of a deci-
sionmaking process in which the SSA made available to anyone 
who disagreed with such a determination a post-termination 
oral evidentiary hearing before an ALJ. Thus, it would be fair 
to say that the Eldridge opinion gave rise to a permissible infer-
ence that the Court would have required the SSA to provide a 
dissatisfied applicant for disability benefits the opportunity 
for an oral evidentiary hearing at some time before or within 
a reasonable period after the agency makes an initial decision 
that denies or terminates benefits.
It is highly unlikely that the Court would convert that permis-
sible inference into a holding today, however, for several reasons. 
First, the reasoning in Eldridge supports the holding in Eldridge 
and not the inference some read into Eldridge. The Court rea-
soned that the SSA could resolve the kinds of factual disputes 
that arise in disability disputes with tolerable accuracy based 
on a paper hearing in which agency officials rely exclusively on 
written submissions from applicants and doctors. The Court 
expressed the view that it was not important for the fact finder 
to be able to observe the demeanor of witnesses in making this 
class of decisions.
Second, as I have documented at length elsewhere, the vast 
majority of federal agencies have replaced oral hearings with writ-
ten hearings in the context of many types of agency adjudications 
over the decades since the Court issued its opinion in Eldridge. 
Some courts initially balked at that dramatic change in the pro-
cedures agencies use to adjudicate disputes, but every circuit has 
now indicated its approval of that change in many contexts. To 
paraphrase now-Justice Scalia, agencies and courts gradually have 
allowed reason to triumph over the courtroom mystique. Replac-
ing oral hearings with paper hearings in the context of SSA dis-
ability decisions would just be another logical step down a road 
that many agencies and courts have taken with excellent results.
The Current System and the Constitution
Any court that confronts a constitutional challenge to the 
changes I urge should be influenced by its recognition that 
the present method of SSA disability decisionmaking is clearly 
unconstitutional. That conclusion flows inevitably from sev-
eral characteristic of the present process. First, ALJs make final 
decisions to grant disability benefits. Second, SSA ALJs are 
employed by the agency, which, in turn, is an independent 
agency headed by a commissioner who serves a six-year term 
and who can only be removed by the president for “neglect of 
duty or malfeasance in office.” Third, ALJs can be removed only 
by the MSPB and only for “good cause.” Fourth, the MSPB is 
an independent agency headed by three members who serve 
seven-year terms and who can be removed by the president 
only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 
Each of those characteristics has important legal conse-
quences. Because ALJs make final decisions to grant benefits, 
they are “officers of the United States” rather than employees. 
In Landry v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the D.C. Cir-
cuit resolved a dispute with respect to the legal status of ALJs 
who work at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The 
petitioner argued that he had been the subject of an unlawful 
decision because the ALJ who issued an initial decision adverse to 
the petitioner was an “officer of the United States” who had not 
been appointed in a manner consistent with the Appointments 
Clause. The court held, 2–1, that FDIC ALJs are employees rather 
than officers. 
The dissenting judge expressed the view that FDIC ALJs are 
officers. The majority based its disagreement with that conclu-
sion exclusively on one characteristic of the FDIC decisionmak-
ing process: Like most agencies, the FDIC’s rules authorize an 
ALJ only to make an “initial decision.” The FDIC rules empower 
the agency to substitute its opinion, including its findings of 
fact, for the initial decision of an ALJ. The majority concluded 
that the lack of the power to make a final decision was “critical” 
to its decision that the FDIC ALJs are employees rather than 
officers. The majority made it clear that it would agree with the 
dissenting judge if the FDIC ALJs had the power to make final 
decisions. The SSA’s rules allow an appeal of an ALJ decision to a 
higher authority in the agency only at the behest of an applicant 
whose application for benefits has been denied by an ALJ. ALJ 
decisions that grant benefits are final. They are not reviewable by 
any institution of government. Thus, it is clear that SSA ALJs are 
“officers” as that term is used in the Constitution.
The holding in the Supreme Court’s 2010 opinion in Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) applies directly to SSA ALJs. In PCAOB, the Court held 
unconstitutional the statutory limit on the power of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission to remove members of the board 
because of what the Court assumed to be the statutory limits 
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on the president’s power to remove SEC members. As the Court 
framed the question before it:
The question is whether these separate layers of protection may be 
combined. May the President be restricted in his ability to remove 
a principal officer, who is in turn restricted in his ability to remove 
an inferior officer, even though that inferior officer determines the 
policy and enforces the laws of the United States?
We hold that such multilevel protection from removal is contrary 
to Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President.
The Court then explained its holding: 
This novel structure does not merely add to the Board’s indepen-
dence, but transforms it. Neither the President nor anyone who is 
directly responsible to him, nor even an officer whose conduct he may 
review only for good cause, has full control over the Board. The Presi-
dent is stripped of the power our precedents have preserved, and his 
ability to execute the laws — by holding his subordinates accountable 
for their conduct — is impaired.
That arrangement is contrary to Article II’s vesting of the executive 
power in the President.
The unconstitutionality of the multiple layers of insulation of 
SSA ALJs from the president follows a fortiori from the holding 
and reasoning in PCAOB. Indeed, SSA ALJs may even be “prin-
cipal officers” rather than “inferior officers.” To be an “inferior 
officer,” an officer must be inferior to someone. The Court has 
used two criteria to decide whether an officer is an inferior to a 
principal officer: the extent of the principal officer’s ability to 
overrule the officer’s decisions and the extent of the principal 
officer’s ability to remove the officer. In theory, SSA ALJs work 
for the Social Security commissioner. The commissioner has not 
attempted to overrule an ALJ decision to grant disability benefits 
in decades, however, and he lacks the resources needed to review 
more than a tiny fraction of such decisions even if he were to 
decide to devote some of the agency’s scarce resources to that task. 
The commissioner has no power to remove an ALJ for any reason. 
Incredibly, the commissioner is forbidden even to evaluate the 
performance of ALJs. The commissioner’s only relevant power 
is the power to petition the MSPB to remove an ALJ for “good 
cause.” That is far short of the powers that the Court requires a 
principal officer to have with respect to another officer in order to 
render the other officer “inferior” to the principal officer.
SSA ALJs are insulated from presidential control by three 
layers of restrictions on the president’s power over the executive 
branch. An SSA ALJ can only be removed by the MSPB for “good 
cause” in response to a petition for removal filed by the SSA. An 
MSPB member can only be removed by the president for “inef-
ficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” The Social 
Security commissioner can only be removed by the president 
for “neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.” Since SSA ALJs 
are officers of the United States, there is no doubt that the three 
layers of removal limits that insulate SSA ALJs from presidential 
control are unconstitutional.
I expect that Judge Daugherty will seek review of the commis-
sioner’s action in court. If so, that case will provide an ideal vehicle 
for a judicial opinion that holds the statutory limits on the power 
to remove SSA ALJs unconstitutional. Indeed, that is the only 
means through which the commissioner can attempt to defend his 
decision to suspend the ALJ, since he is prohibited by statute from 
taking any action against an ALJ, specifically including suspension. 
Conclusion
SSA ALJs are responsible for about 1 percent of total federal 
spending in the 2011 budget — an amount equivalent to 2.5 
percent of the 2011 budget deficit. Yet they are accountable to 
no one. As a result of this blatantly unconstitutional allocation 
of power, some SSA ALJs are engaging in unprecedented binge 
spending while the president and Congress are desperately try-
ing to identify and implement massive spending cuts in virtu-
ally all other parts of the budget that are essential to restore a 
sustainable fiscal policy for the nation.
There are several ways in which we can attempt to address 
this problem. My preferred solution would be to abolish the ALJ-
administered part of the disability decisionmaking process and to 
use at least part of the resulting savings to implement a system of 
reviewing past decisions to grant disability benefits to determine 
whether each beneficiary actually suffers from a permanent dis-
ability so serious that he cannot perform the functions needed 
to hold any job in the U.S. economy.
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